# Changelog All notable changes to `yin-cert-verify` are documented here. Binaries are distributed from **https://certification.yintechnologies.com/download/**. ## v1.3.0 Reports the schema v1.4 authorization block. - Displays `authorizer_identity`, `authorization_scope` and `authorization_validity` in both the human-readable output and `--json`, when a certificate carries them. - Only the credential hash is ever shown. A certificate never carries raw identity, and the verifier never reconstructs or requests it. - Reports the certificate's `schema_version` on its own line. - **Supported schema versions: v1.2, v1.3 and v1.4.** Verification itself is unchanged and remains version-agnostic: every field outside the two signature objects enters the canonical-CBOR preimage, so the v1.4 authorization block was already covered by both signatures before this release. Altering any field in it invalidates the certificate. What is new is that the verifier now *shows* those fields instead of passing over them. v1.2 and v1.3 certificates verify exactly as before, and their output is byte-identical to v1.2.0. Binaries for Linux (x86-64) and macOS (x86-64, Apple Silicon). ## v1.2.0 M4 Tracking schema flattened: `tracking_coverage_rate`, `target_coverage_rate` and `coverage_within_bound` moved to the top level of `m4_tracking`; the `kalman_conformal` wrapper was removed. Verification is a signature check over canonical CBOR and is schema-agnostic, so v1.1.0 also verifies these certificates. v1.2.0 aligns the verifier release with the schema-1.2 platform; there is no verification-logic change from v1.1.0. ## v1.1.0 Verifies the ML-DSA-87 (NIST FIPS 204) post-quantum signature alongside Ed25519. - Both signatures cover the identical body, so one preimage is reconstructed and both are checked against it. - ML-DSA-87 is required when present: a certificate carrying an invalid post-quantum signature fails even if its Ed25519 signature is valid. - Uses the same PQClean implementation as the issuer's signer, so verification is exact. ## v1.0.0 Initial release — offline verifier for YIN-AI CERTIFICATION ACR certificates. - Reconstructs the exact issuer signing preimage `SHA-256("yin-ai-certification/v1/ACRCertificate" || 0x00 || canonical_cbor(body))` using RFC 8949 §4.2 canonical CBOR (length-first map-key ordering, minimal float16/32/64 encoding, minimal integers), byte-identical to the issuer's encoder. - Verifies the Ed25519 signature (strict) against a pinned issuer key (`--issuer-key`) or the key embedded in the certificate (self-attested). - Reports the framework citation DOIs and issuer identity. - `--json` machine-readable output; reads a certificate from a file or stdin. - Fully offline — no network access required. - Binaries for Linux (x86-64) and macOS (x86-64, Apple Silicon), checksummed in `SHA256SUMS`. Framework: Authority Confidence Rating standard, Zenodo DOI 10.5281/zenodo.19363193 (companion base standard DOI 10.5281/zenodo.19361421). ACR grades authorization confidence; AQL quantifies residual liability.